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BILL C-127 
In our booklet dealing with Bill C-127, •ome co111Dents are ude on 
pages about begging as contained in section 244 of the Criminal Code. 
The comaents are valid but •hould have included the hardly noticeable 
but •ignificant change to eubsection 244(l)(c) c.c. 
We did not notice this obscure change until the day after we published 
the book.let. 
In respect to •assault by begging" the section now reads: 
.. A person commits assault when • • • while openly 
wearing or carrying a weapon or an immitation 
thereof, he accosts or impedes another person •o•• 
begs. 
The capitalized and underlined ·oa· used to be ·and.. in the old 
eection. This change is •ignificant in that the elements of the 
offence used to be conjunctive and are now alternative. This Eans 
that begging while openly carrying a weapon now amounts to assault 
where before the begger had, in addition, to impede or accost another 
person. 
Although this is •ubject to judicial interpretation, it is now con-
•tructive assault for someone to openly carry or wear a weapon or an 
iDDitation thereof and 
1. accost another person; 
2. impede another person; Oil 
3. beg. 
This •ans that while ar11ed as described above and accosting or 
i•peding •oaeone is assault as i• to beg while eo ar11ed. 
* * • • • 
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UFUSillG 'ID GI.YB IRIA!B SAllPLB 1lr'l1I. lllVIJIG CDllTACDD 1111 CDUSSICI. al 
THE ACCUSED'S CHOICE - UASOllABLE UQJSE 
The Queen v. Davignon County Court of Cariboo Williama Lake Registry 
No. 22/82 
A police officer who was directing traffic at the scene of an accident 
was alerted about the. unsteady driving of the accused who bad just 
passed by (he was not involved in the accident). The officer caught 
up to the accused in about 600 yards and stopped him at 8:35 p.m. 
Noticing some symptoms of impairment, a demand for breath samples was 
made and the accused arrived at the police station at approximately 
9:08 p.m. The accused, who had already indicated at the scene that he 
was only too willing to do what was demanded of him, stipulated that 
he firstly wanted to speak to his lawyer. Be made phone calls to his 
lawyer's office and home but was not successful in reaching him. It 
was suggested to the accused that he should phone another lawyer but 
he insisted on contaeting this particular lawyer before complying with 
the demand. At 9:28 the accused was urged to comply but refused and 
was again given the opportunity to try to phone his counsel. As he 
was simply not getting anywhere the breathalyzer operator entered a 
refusal in the log book. 
At trial in the Provincial Court the accused, of course, claimed that 
in view of his right to counsel, he had a reasonable excuse to refuse 
giving the samples of breath. The trial judge had responded that: 
" ••• there is no evidence that allowing m>re time 
would have accomplished anything useful, in my 
opinion anyway. The conclusion is inescapable that 
there was a refusal and no reasonable excuse". 
The accused appealed his conviction and argued his case on the basis 
of a decision by the County Court in Chilliwack in October of 1981* 
where the circumstances were nearly identical to those in this 
Davignon case. In the Eddy case the County Court Judge had said 
(speaking to police being busy and having other functions to perform 
other than sitting by while the suspect makes ahaustive attempts to 
contact his lawyer): 
•However, be that as it .. Y, a person's right to 
* &. v. Eddy Chilliwack Registry Nwaber 214/81. 
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contact counsel cannot be treated lightly. Vhen a 
person is in custody and that person is facing 
possible criminal charges he 1• clearly entitled to 
contact counsel of bis choice". 
In eHence • it was held that Eddy vas acting in a bona fide manner 
while trying to contact counsel and as far as the County Court in 
respect to Mr. Davignon (the accuaed) was concerned. ao was be. 
Note: 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction aet aaide. 
Although this was not an iasue in this case the County Court Judge 
explored whether there were reasonable and probable grounds for the 
officer to make the demand for breath samples. Be held that. bad this 
been a ground for the appeal, he would have allowed it. The officer, 
the Judge aaid, bad only aome information from another person. He 
then jumped in his car, went 600 yards and atopped the appellant•. 
The lack of evidence of iaproper driving, incoordinatlon, or diffi-
culty in producing documents coupled with an apparently insignificant 
observation that the hack of the accused's ahirt was out of his blue 
jeans, left the evidence woefully abort of persuading tbe Court that 
the demanding officer bad reasonable and probable grounds to make his 
demand. 
Comment: There are matters in this case that should cause aome 
concern. The reasons for judgment indicate that the Court assumed 
that the accused was in custody. There is no reason given for this 
conclusion. One need not to have been arrested to be detained, but 
detention does require physical control or restriction*. A aiaple 
demand and a compliance vi thout being locked in tbe back of a police 
car or being handcuffed. or other indications that there was •coapul-
aory or actual physical restraint• does not by itself cauae a sus-
pected iapaired driver of whoa a deaand for breath aaaplea ia •de to 
be detained or arrested. light to counsel 1a guaranteed to arrested 
or detained peraons only. 
Another Mjor problea created by precedents of thia kind 1a that it 
force• police to uae alternative •ethods to reaove iapaired drivers 
froa the road. It coapel•• for purely practical reasona, that the 
* Chroaiak v. The queen 49 c.c.c. (2d) 2S7. See also page 3 of Volume 
1 of thia publication. 
- ... 
discretion the peace off ice rs will exercise is not based on the lev.l 
of illpairment or gravity Of circumstances, but aiaply if they can 
afford the time to proceBS the suspect. Discretion, based on au~h 
consideration, is an abuse of the principles on which the exercise bf 
original and discretionary authority is based. 
It is also a matter of concern if the right to counsel is extended to 
counsel of one's choice. When a certain lawyer simply cannot be 
located, after reasonable attempts have been made, then the 
Brownridge* decision by the Supreme Court of Canada seems applicable. 
It clearly points out that where an accused has been given an oppor-
tunity to contact a lawyer but is unable to do so after repeated 
attempts through no fault of the police, refuses to provide a breath 
sample he does not have a reasonable excuse for refusing. One could 
argue that since the Brownridge decision the Charter of Rights became 
effective and that it invalidated this precedent. However, the Right 
to counsel existed at common law and was codified in 1960 in the Bill 
of Rights. Even at the time of the Brownridge decision in 1972 the 
Right was so basic and judicially supported that it was suggested that 
the Right to counsel would have caused Brownridge to be acquitted for 
refusing to give a breath sample even if the section had not specified 
that the refusal had to be without reasonable excuse. Some Justices 
of the Supreme Court said that a denial to counsel •vitiates a convi~: 
tion for this offence". Furthermore the decision in the Eddy case (in 
which the County Judge found support for his views) was well before 
the Charter coming into effect. Although the Courts are likely to pay 
more attention to a Right included in an entrenched constitution than 
one existing at common law and codified in an ordinary statute (as the 
Bill of Rights is), it seems that the application of it was as strin-
gently enforced by the Courts before the Charter as they have since 
this constitutional document came into effect. 
In 1970, the beathalyzer laws were enacted as a partial remedy to the 
slaughter and maiming of people on our highways which we do at a rate 
which would be called civil war if it was the result of a national 
diapute. It worked reasonably well and was of usistance to prove 
various elements to the drinking/driving offences. Far be it frc:a me 
to advocate oppressive procedures or excessive measures or anything 
that violates the principles that ensure a fair and impartial trial, 
however, we have managed over the years to convert something that was 
deaigned to &Hist in coabatting a aerious aocial ill into an obs-
tacle. Innovative legal philosophies and bureaucratic servitudes are 
well on their way to render these Criminal Code provisions a legiala-
ti ve tiger with aevere dental problems. 
* Brownridge v. The queen (1972) 7 c.c.c. (2d) 417 
- s -
In addi tlon there are grave doubta if legialation alone can remedy 
thi• problem. Iapaired driving 18 •ocially con•idered an act of 
indiacretion; aoaething like a virus ve all are •u•ceptible to. 
Sboplif ting, which does not physically jeopardize anyone, aay •an 
aocial devastation and irreparable harm to our credibility, and giving 
intoxication as an excuse will no doubt aggrevate the aocial 
adversities to our reputation. That Pete was roaaing around a depart-
ment store in a atate of intoxication and did not pay for merchandise 
is socially unacceptable; that be had attended a retirement party, had 
a few too .. ny and wiped out hie fellow aan on the way home, calls for 
understanding and compassion. After all, that could happen to all of 
us. 
History contains an abundance of proof that law is seldom remedial 
unleas there is social disapproval of the act it prohibits. Its a 
aat ter of fact •ocial disapproval is often remedial by itself. It 
reduced pollution while social acceptance increased dissolve11ent of 
families. Although these examples are simplistic and involve other 
considerations, they are basically sound to aupport that aocial 
rejection and disapproval often precedes legislation and supersedes it 
in effectiveness. Perhaps we have to have an all out propaganda 
campaign to expose the drinking/driver as a public enemy; a person who 
perhaps violated the law but aore importantly was so incredibly 
inconsiderate, so egotistical, ao utterly negligent that be is quite 
prepared to randomly maim, kill or just jeopardize hie fellow citizen 
for the sake of getting home and being spared the inconvenience for 
not having his car available to him when be auet get to work tomorrow 
with that terrible hangover. 
* * * * * 
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TllE lllWIIBG C1I •PLACE• 
SQICRTRG A PEI.SOii 111DD DIE IOOD AllD llUJGS M:r (SZCl'IOB 10) 
Olt IWlCOTIC CORTIOL Ac:r (SICTIOll 37) 
Recently a B. C. 1DUnicipal constable stopped a known drug trafficker 
on the street and detected a strong smell of hashish on him. He 
searched the man and found a paper bag. The suspect grabbed the bag 
out of the officer's band and ran. Be was later apprehended and 
charged with obstructing a peace officer in the lawful performance of 
his duty. The bag, which he conceded in testimony contained the 
prohibited 1DUshrooms, was not found. The accused raised a technical 
defence and submitted that the officer's search for drugs on his 
person was unlawful as it was unauthorized by statute or common law. 
The incident occurred on a public street. The accused argued that 
section 37 of the Food and Drugs Act did not apply. 
The applicable portion of Section 37 of the Food and Drugs Act reads 
as follows: 
"A peace officer may at any time 
(a) without a warrant enter and search any place 
other than a dwelling-house, and under the 
authority of a writ of assistance or a warrant 
issued under this section, enter and search 
any dwelling-house in which he reasonably 
believes there is a controlled drug by means 
of or in respect of which an offence under 
this Part has been committed; 
(b) search anr person found in such place; and 
(c) seize and take away any controlled drug found 
in such place and any other thing that 11ay be 
evidence that an of fence under this Part has 
been committed ; " 
The accused submitted that the section authorizes the searching of 
persons only in "any place" the officer "aay enter and search without 
warrant" upon reasonably believing there are controlled drugs by means 
of which an of fence under the Act is committed. 
The section implies that "any place" is a constitutionally protected 
place; a place police have no right to enter if it is not for the 
reasonable grounds for believing that drugs are present. Only in "any 
place" like that entered by police upon prerequisite grounds to do so, 
aay any person found "in such place" be searched, the accused claimed. 
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A public place is not included in the •any place• u uaed in the 
•ection, argued the accused, hence the officer vaa not in the lawful 
perf oraance of hia duty. The Provincial Court Judge agreed and gave 
the Crown a couple of weeks to ahow thia defence wrong. In the 
absence of doing ao the accused would be acquitted. 
To assist, a search was done of cases on this iaaue. 
auf f icient interest to include it in this ~lume. 
It aee• of 
The B. C. case in which this wry iasue was decided in 1977 ia Regina 
v. Hamilton (County Court). The reasons for judgment can be found on 
page 146 of Volume 7 of the British Columbia Law Reports. 
This Hinds case was decided on a charge under the Narcotic Control 
Act. Section 10 of that Act, with the exception of some necessary 
differences in subsection (c), is identical to 8ection 37 of the Food 
and Drugs Act. 
In the Hinds case, a police constable encountered a car parked in a 
peculiar position off the highway. Upon checking it be found 
aarihuana on the ground next to the car. . Be deterained that the 
narcotic belonged to the passenger. Be then turned his attention to 
Hinds, the driver, who submitted hiuelf to a body search. When the 
officer reached under the belt line be felt a plastic bag adjacent to 
Binds' aborts. When the officer attempted to pull it out the accused 
objected and resisted the officer. A passing motorist usisted and 
Hinds was subdued, arrested and charged with resisting a peace officer 
in the lawful performance of his duty. Binds raised arguments 
identical as related above. They were to no avail in the Provincial 
Court and he appealed his conviction to the County Court. Be even had 
a more restricted view of what "'place· ahould include and submitted 
that the section implied by saying that •entering"' .. y be done without 
warrant, that it referred only to a building or structure. This 
particularly since in the next breath it 11entions a dwelling house as 
an exemption to such entering unless there i• a writ of aaaiatance. 
The County Court disagreed with Baailton '• •ieva and concluded that 
one can enter any place whether this be a field, a garden, a atreet, 
lane or building. Therefore, the words in aection 10 of the Narcotic 
Control Act do not have the liaitationa Ballilton suggested. 
Baailton'• appeal was disaiaaed and hia conviction upheld. Thia case 
baa not been overruled and la to the beat of ay knowledge •till the 
lav in I. c. 
* * * * * 
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CUDUILift 
TBE VOJlD OF TD ACQJSBD YS. 'l'B&.T OF A POLICE OFFICER 
R. v. Scoville County Court of Cariboo No. 1/82 Ashcroft Registry 
October 1982 
The patrol car 
simultaneously. 
accused alighted 
driving and the 
was nevertheless 
and the vehicle pulled over by it, stopped 
When the officer came to the driver's door the 
from it. The officer did not ask if the accused was 
accused did not indicate whether he was or not, but 
convicted of impaired driving. 
The accused testified that his girlfriend was driving and that they 
had switched places the very moment they had come to a stop. He gave 
no reason for having done so. This meant that there was no direct 
evidence that the accused had been driving other than the officer's 
testimony that the accused came from behind the wheel. 
The accused appealed his conviction on the grounds of the precedentl 
that 
". • • an explanation given by an accused that 
could reasonably be true, despite the fact that the 
tribunal was not convinced that it was true, 
entitles the accused to the benefit of reasonable 
doubt and accordingly, acquittal". 
This argument was quickly defeated by the Crown who brought to the 
attention of the Court that this aust only be applied in cases where 
the accused 1111st explain or else stand condemned. For instance where 
a person is in possession of goods recently obtained by crime. He 
must explain right away or by means of testimony or else the inference 
may be drawn that he committed the crime by which the goods were 
obtained or did have knowledge that they were so obtained2. It does 
not apply in all cases where an accused, in his defence, decides to 
.come up with some version of the events in issue that would exculpate 
him criminally. 
1 R. v. Gavrilovic (1974) 18 c.c.c. {2d) 287. 
2 R. v. Sugiyoma [1976) 2 B.C.L.R. 164 
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The County Court found that the constable'• evidence vas liaited but 
•. • • that in term of ti• and proximity. the 
appellant vas 110st certainly the peraon in the 
operator'• position .. the appellant'• vehicle and 
the police vehicle came to a atop ••• •• 
The verdict of the Provincial Court Judge was not unreasonable and was 
supported by the evidence. 
* * * * * 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction Upheld. 
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CUDIBILITY 
SBCTIOll 12 OP DIE CA•ADA BVIDDCI Acr .&llD DIE CllAUD OP Uc:aTS 
R. v. Jarosz B. C. Supreme Court Vancouver Registry CC 820820 
September 1982. 
Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act allows a witness to be cross 
examined on whether he has been convicted of any offence. This, of 
course, to discredit him and thereby shed doubt on his testimony. If 
an accused person selects to testify at his trial, the same rule 
applies. 
Section ll(d) of the Charter of Rights guarantees us to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. Although this presumption was alive and 
well prior to the Charter coming into effect, the accused, when cross 
examined at his trial re his previous conviction, claimed that since 
the entrenchment of this right in the Charter, section 12 of the 
Evidence Act is now invalid. In other words he claimed that having 
•constitutionalized' the right, it carries now more weight and has 
greater impact than what it did previously. 
For good measure, the age old argument was thrown in that when a jury 
bears that the accused has a record it will not be able to use that 
evidence exclusively to deal with his credibility (whether to believe 
his testimony). The jury will inevitably be influenced (particularly 
when the convictions include a crime similar to the one for which he 
stands trial) to believe that the accused is guilty of what is alleged 
against him. 
The Court concluded that credibility is critical in many cases and 
that both the Crown and the defence must have the ability to test 
credibility within the limits of the law. When a jury is properly 
instructed on this issue it will not result in an unfair trial or 
affect the presumption of innocence. 
Application to rule section 12 Canada 
Evidence Act 
Invalid was denied. 
* * * * * 
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UASOllAIU DCUSE 
Barr v. The queen County Court of B. C. Rossland Registry CC 102/82 
The accused was involved in a single vehicle accident on an abandoned 
stretch of road. A paBBer-by gave him a ride to the next town and 
dropped him off at the police station where the accused was promptly 
subjected to sobriety tests followed by a demand for samples of 
breath. The accused who had sustained very minor personal injuries 
(hand and forehead) refused to give samples of any kind until he had 
received some medical treatment. Although the officer had expressed 
that the injuries were too ainor to serve as an excuse to refuse to 
give sa11ples, he drove the accused to the hospital where ·some treat-
ment .. was given. The accused was convicted of failing to give breath 
samples and appealed claiming that bis request for •dical attention 
was bone fide, secondly that the officer had lacked the reasonable and 
probable grounds to aake the demand. 
The accused did not lead any evidence about his injuries while the 
onus was on him to show on the preponderance of evidence that he had a 
reasonable excuse because of 
.. circUlll8tance which rendered compliance with the 
demand either extremely difficult or iikely to 
involve a substantial risk to his health ..... * 
The County Court Judge could not find anything in the evidence that 
gave the accused such an excuse. 
In regards to the second ground the evidence showed that the accused 
arrived at the Police station fast asleep on the back seat of his 
benefactor'• car. When awakened with difficulty the accused said he 
vas alone vhen he had the accident 1 1/2 hours ago. Furthermore he 
•olunteered that he had nothing to drink since he drove his car. 
Therefore, the officer bad the grounds prerequisite to -king the 
deaand. 
* * * * * 
* Regina v. Nadeau 19 c.c.c. (2d) 199 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
- 12 -
IMPAIUD DR.IVDIC 
UPUSDIG 'IO GIVE SAllPLBS OF BUATll 
Regina v. Melgaard County Court of Vancouver Island Vancouver 1982 
Duncan Registry 044682 
The accused was seen driving a car that 'wandered' within its own 
lane. He was given a roadside sobriety test and a demand for samples 
of breath was made. The accused responded that he did not mind to 
give the samples but objected to have to go with the officer. It was 
pointed out to him that that amounted to 'refusal' and an appearance 
notice was prepared for impaired driving and refusing to blow. While 
this was done the accused 'demanded' to have his driver's licence 
returned to him and was not willing to wait until the notice was 
completed. The accused was then arrested for being drunk in a public 
place. The following morning, approximately six hours later, the 
accused was released and the appearance notice then served on him. 
During his custody he was not given the opportunity to provide the 
demanded samples of breath. 
The accused was convicted of both impaired driving and 'refusing' and 
appealed these verdicts. 
The County Court Judge was very critical of the way police handled the 
case. He considered the arrest for drunkenness '"spurious'" and said 
someone could be excused for inferring that the officer had limited 
experience in dealing with impaired drivers. Co11111ent was made of the 
fact that no opportunity was afforded the accused to redeem himself 
and give the samples and that none of the station officers were called 
to verify the accused's condition when booked. Furthermore the County 
Court Judge seemingly reluctantly accepted the facts as they had been 
found by the learned trial Judge, '"although I think my reaction to the 
evidence would have been different ..... be •aid. 
The County Court Judge found the Crown's case flimsy and far short of 
meeting the burden of proof; the drunkenness charge was '"trumped up'"; 
the role of 'the other constable' very paHive and his evidence of a 
kind that added nothing to the Crown's case; the lack of an opportun-
ity to give samples of breath after the arrest was deprivation 
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of •natural ju•tice•; and •ince the admini•tration of ju•tice begins 
vith the police, the handling of the c.a•e vaa unfair llftd !aproper. 
Furthermore the County Court Judge obaerved that the place where the 
accu•ed had done his drinking was no more than 5 ainute• away from the 
accu•ed'a hoae (what bearing this h .. ia anyone'• gue••) and that the 
work the accused had been doing •aight well explain in part at least 
the condition of his eyes and perhaps his balance·. 
In re•pect to the accused'• belligerent attitude at the acene the 
Judge observed that the officer •became very irritated with the 
accused's behaviour, who admittedly was abuaive and upset, for which 
there could be a number of explanations·. 
The accused's appeal was allowed. 
The two convictions were quashed. 
* * * * * 
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CRJJIJDI. llBGLIGDCE - DAllGDOUS DUVIllG 
R. v. Stebbing County Court of Westminster January 1983 No. X828307 
New Westminster Registry 
At 1:00 a.m. there were four cars on a one mile stretch of a four lane 
highway and death and serious injuries resulted from a bead-on 
collision. Three of the cars were proceeding north and the fourth in 
a southern direction. 
The three cars were two vehicles side by side doing in excess of 160 
k.p.h. while the speed limit was 70 k.p.h. anl:l the third was a police 
car following at nearly a 1/2 mile distance. The accused was in the 
curb lane. After be had entered the stretch of road he had accelera-
ted very quickly as had the other (cutting out all the descriptive 
niceties, they were simply drag racing although the reasons for judg-
aent do not aay so). The Court said, .. An unspoken challenge and 
acceptance of that challenge might be inferred. I do not do so·. The 
two cars touched one another slightly and the accused beaded for the 
ditch while the other car in the center lane headed for a terrible 
bead-on collision, death and destruction. The police officers wit-
nessed the actions leading up to the collision and the accident 
itself. 
As the police officers had not activated the emergency lights on the 
police car, the Court inferred that the officers did not apprehend any 
danger from driving at a high speed in view of the road conditions or 
density of traffic. The Court held that the major collision was of 
only peripheral relevance to the proceedings. In other words, the 
accused was not to blame for the collision. Therefore, the necessary 
moral element for criminal negligence driving, alleged against the 
accused, was lacking. 
However, the Court held that dangerous driving is an included offence 
in criminal negligent driving and concluded: 
·Driving at a speed far above the limit which either elimin-
ates the ability to unoeuvre safely when the unexpected 
occurs or which leads directly to loss of control when there 
b an intervening event, the potential for which event is 
recognizable although not be expected, is dangerous within 
section 233(4), particularly where there is a real danger to 
at least one other person then the driver, in this case Mr. 
Saith• (the accused's passenger). 
Convicted of dangerous driving 
* * * * * 
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JURllILBS - CBAUD or nGBTS 
a. v. S.B. w.w.R. (1983) 1 w.R.R. 
British Columbia Supreme Court 
S.B. vas a 12 year old charged vith three delinquencies, to wit 
breaking & entering vith intent; aischief and .etting fire to .. terial 
which could likely cause a building fire. Under the provisions of the 
Juvenile Delinquents Act the Court ia authorized to Mntence S.B. to 
an Industrial School until he reaches the age of 21 years. Consider-
ing his present age, that means that the •xiaum imprisonment to which 
S. B. is liable 1a 9 years - in any event, a period in exceBS of 5 
years. 
Section ll(f) of the Charter of lights states: 
·Any person charged with an offence baa the right 
to the benefit of trial by jury vhere the maximum. 
punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five 
years or a aore severe punishment•. 
Defence counsel aade a preliminary objection in Provincial Court 
challenging the Judge's jurisdiction to try S.B. without a jury. As 
the Judge rejected the 1ubmiBSion the issue was taken to the Supreme 
Court. 
The Crown took the position that .ection 11 of the Charter does not 
include delinquencies. Furthermore, the proceedings are, according to 
section 5 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, to be sulllll&ry in nature. 
Hence, there is no provision for a juvenile to elect how he wishes to 
be tried unless he is transferred to adult court. 
The Supreme Court Justice had to conaider if the Charter of tights 
renders these provisions of the Juvenile Delinquent• Act of no force 
or effect insofar as they are inconsistent vith one another. 
Secondly, if section 1 of the Charter vhich, in essence, tella the 
Judiciary that they aaat not apply the Charter beyond the reasonable 
liaita aa can be deaonatrably juatified in a free and de110cratic 
•ociety, ueapta the Juvenile Delinquents Act froa being conlistent 
with the Charter. 
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The Supreme Court of B. c. concluded: 
1. That a juvenile charged with an offence known as a delin-
quency for which he can be sentenced to more than five years 
to an industrial school, is entitled to elect trial by jury 
if he so desires; 
2. That the Juvenile Delinquent Act'• denial of juveniles being 
tried by a jury, is not merely a reasonable limit which is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society; and 
3. The Juvenile Delinquents Act ia of no force or effect to the 
extent that it is inconsistent with section ll(f) of the 
Charter. 
This simply means that a juvenile, in many if not aost cases, will 
have the right to a jury trial. 
Comment: This is another delay in the pursuit of the objectives of 
our juvenile laws which were designed to get on with the aost 
iaportant aspect of preparing the '"generation in the wings.. to cope 
with and to be constructive aeabers of society. The laws which were 
intended to be a practical means to an end are becoming the end in 
itself. 
It is important to demonstrate to our young citizens, that the system 
which determines their guilt or innocence is fair and just. However, 
manipulative legal 11aneuvering has no place in a juvenile justice 
system; it is too damaging to the impression it leaves with the young 
person; their sense of justice is still too basic, the co-existance of 
factual guilt and legal innocence in our aystea is too complex for 
them. Therefore, we hardly impress the next generation or do anything 
constructive for them with iapleaenting all our legal luxeries in 
their justice ayetea. What is necesaary or appropriate in the adult 
ayatea is capable of being euperf luous and inappropriate when we deal 
with young wayward•, particularly in view of tbe stated objective of 
tbe juvenile procedures. 
Our proposed Young Of fenders Act places a heavy emphasis on access to 
counsel at nearly every stage of tbe juvenile's involveaent in the 
procedure. Instead of doing the customary scoffing of this, we must 
not underestimate the dile- this places on conscientious counsel. 
Hie ethical obligations to look after the legal intereat of his client 
and the pedagogical objectivea of the juvenile law to deal with the 
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child u one who requires help, guidance and proper aupervieion, are 
·diabolically opposed to one another. A delinquent youth with bis 
basic under•tanding of justice and unawarenea• of procedural niceties, 
vbo i• witness to the tactic• rendering him legally innocent while he 
b factually guilty, has an experience with our legal ay•tea not 
unlike the child taken to a brothel to introduce it to the beauty of 
love. The ethics and precedents which coapel our lawyen and judges 
to act as they do ·wen dealing with juveniles is surely inconsistent 
with the guidance and help Parliament had in aind for those we are to 
prepare to become responsible 11eabers of aociety. 
Another thought that one cannot help to surface ia the legal submis-
sions when a jury is selected. The jury history dates back to the 
Magna Carta of 1215, which determined in article 39 that no one shall 
be imprisoned or penalized other than by tbe judgment of bis peers. 
It will be interesting if those by statute eligible for jury duty are 
seen as his elders rather than his peers. Perhaps a jury of citizens 
of his own age uy well have a concept of justice that is more fair, 
fundamental and in line with the delinquent's understanding of it than 
ours. Another solution to the juvenile procedure problellS may well be 
to adopt the inquisitory system instead of the adversary one we now 
use. 
* * * * * 
llote: 
Since writing all these comments, the B. c. Court of Appeal rendered 
judgment on this case (February 12/83, CA 821306). The Justices 
unanimously decided that the purpose of the Juvenile Delinquents Act 
is not to punish but to provide treatment to a child in need of 
guidance and supervision. Confinement in an industrial school does, 
therefore, not constitute punishment. Hence• section ll(f) of the 
Charter does not provide for a juvenile to have a jury trial if he, 
due to hie qe, is eligible to be committed to an industrial 1chool 
for 5 years or aore. • • • 
•PLOP-PLOP, FIZZ-FIZZ, OH WHAT A RELIEF IT 1s• 
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·PIOCEDUliL sm:s TIACllJIG. 
Anaon v. The queen B. c. Court of Appeal #821310 - February 18, 1983 
(Also eee page 9 of 'VOlwae 7 of this publication) 
Anson was charged with po88e88ion of heroin for the purpose of traf-
ficking. At the very outset of the trial the accused asked the Judge 
to rule if section 8 N.C.A. was still operable now that the Charter of 
Rights calls for the presumption of innocence and stipulates that the 
fundamental principles of justice 11\1St be adhered to in processes by 
which persons can be deprived of property or liberty. When the trial 
judge ruled that section 8 N.C.A. can co-exist with section 7, ll(d) 
and 52 of the Charter, the accused was granted an adjournment so he 
could ask the Supreme Court the same question. When he also lost 
there (see reasons in Volume 7 of this publication) he took the 11atter 
to the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
Section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights states: 
•Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed 
by this Charter, have been infringed or denied, 
may apply to a court of competent juristiction 
to obtain such reaedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances". 
It was feared that this section would cause what is known in the U.S. 
as procedural sidetracking. Every time a Charter iBBue would be 
raised and the trial court's ruling would not be to the liking of one 
of the parties, the proceedings would have to come to a stop until the 
matter is decided by a higher court. There were also some questions 
raised as to what level of court bas the competent jurisdiction to 
deal with disputed Charter i88ues. To avoid the ·side tracking" it 
should be the Court that bas jurisdiction to try the accused for the 
offence alleged against him. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that the point of law the accused 
raised was premature. He firstly bad to be found guilty of possession 
of heroin before aection 8 N.C.A. would arise. 
The Court also said that: 
•1t every case is to be interrupted each time a 
conatitutional point arises while prerogative 
relief ia aought, while appeals are taken to 
this Court mid to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
then the adainistration of juatice would be 
chaotic, the cost to the accuaed would be 
oppresaive, and the cost to the public unjusti-
fied". 
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The Court of Appeal ruled that each level of court •hould, 1D nearly 
all caaee, rule on the constitutional point and continue and c:oaplete 
the trial. 1f the verdict i• guilty then the accused can include that 
point in the grounds for hie appeal. 
Accuaed'• appeal diallieeed 
Note: The Alberta Court of Appeal has ruled aillilarly in November of 
1982 in The Queen v. ·Kendall. 
-
During the aonth of February the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island 
and the Court of Appeal of Ontario held in the Queen v. Carroll and 
The Queen v. Oakes respectively, that aection 8 N.C.A. is 
unconstitutional and inoperative. 
It may be of interest to explore what the Ontario Court of Appeal bad 
to say about section 8 of the N.C.A., the aost aevere reversed onus 
clauses on the statute books. The Court reiterated that a reversed 
onus' clause is contrary to •the presumption of innocence· provision 
in the Charter, ~ 
(a) it places a burden of proof on the accused beyond proving 
aomething on a balance of probabilities; or 
(b) it requires the accused to prove aomething that is 
unreasonable to expect him to be able to prove. 
This has always been the test applied to determine the propriety of 
reversed onus clauses. The Ontario Court of Appeal considered it 
necessary however, that since the presumption of innocence and the 
right to remain silent are now entrenched in our constitution, another 
aaf eguard had to be added. 
Every presumption of fact has a proven fact u a prerequisite. For 
instance, to presume the fact that a person bad care or control of a 
aotor vehicle, the Crown (if it relies on the preauaption in s. 237 
c.c.) aust first prove the fact that he occupied the aeat ordinarily 
occupied by the driver. The Court held that froa here-on-in •rational 
connection· between the proven fact and the presumed fact aust be 
conaidered to determine if the presumption can co-exist with the 
Charter. It aaid that auch rational connection only exists where one 
can aay that the proven fact aakes the preaumed fact a probability .and 
poaaeaeion of a narcotic doea not aean that trafficking it · is 
probable. Bence, S. 8 N.C.A. '• preauapUon is unconstitutional, in 
Ontario and Prince Edvard Ialand at least. 
Hot having had the opportunity to read the reasons for judgment in its 
entirety, the quantity of heroin Oakea had in hi• posseaaion I do not 
know. 
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It •eems teapting to deduce that if •ection 8 N.C.A. i• •truck down 
and inoperable, the only way to prove the charge of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking is by the possessor admitting that purpose or 
•bowing that he did traffic. (Of course, if the latter is the case 
•possession for the purpose" aay only be the back-up charge). 
It also seems reasonable to assume that the allegation against Oak.es 
afforded the Ontario Court of Appeal to deal with the constitution-
ality of section 8 N.C.A. and that it ruled the section inoperable in 
all circumstances and not just in circumstances as they were in the 
Oakes case. A lot of common law surrounds section 8 N.C.A. and it 
shoul·d not have been weighed against the Charter without putting all 
that co!llllon law on the scales with the section to see if the aggregate 
tips it in favour of the constitutionality of the presumption. 
However, losing the section is not as devastating as it seems. To put 
it like one very experienced drug law enforcer "it is a non issue". 
In other words, the section was not abused and was not all that 
helpful. 
If the section is inoperable the co111Don law is still valid, but the 
burden to prove will be on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the purpose for the possession was to traffic. It seems 
not inaccurate, that in most cases where there is no direct evidence 
of the intent to traffic, evidence of packaging, documents and the 
quantity of the contraband rather than section 8 N.C.A. dictates 
whether the charge will be possession or possession for the purpose. 
The judges of the facts (juries or judges sitting alone) will still be 
instructed of their right to draw an irresistable inference from 
inculpatory evidence that so surrounds the accused that either he 
explains or stands condemned or convict on evidence that is consistent 
with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. If 
this were not 10, and particularly where the accused is a known 
trafficker, the law would be as absurd as to be coapelled to assume 
that the driver of a bread truck carries his lunch until we actually 
see him making deliveries. 
Please note that this Ontario decision (Oakes v. 'lbe Queen) is not 
binding on the B. c. Courts 
* * * * * 
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POSSESSIOB OP A llAROOTIC 
The Queen v. Sinclair County Court of Westminster New Westminster 
Registry X81-7537 
The accused, the registered owner ad •ole occupant of a car, was 
•topped by police. A paper bag protruded from under the eeat and was 
found to contain five different kinds of narcotics. When questioned, 
the accused denied any knowledge of the bag or its content. Due to 
this ad the fact that the car had been stopped a few weeks earlier 
with a woman driving it caused the County Court Judge to be very 
concerned about concluding that the accused (charged with five counts 
of possession for the purpose of trafficking) was in possession of the 
narcotics. 
The Crown invited the Court to follow a decision by the New Brunswick 
Supreme Court* where the circumstances were similar, but where, 
instead of saying '"I don't know'" like this accused, Vautour said, ·1•m 
fucked· and when asked what he said, replied: •That really fucks 
it... This the County Court Judge held was an indication of guilt on 
the part of Vautour and, therefore, the cases are distinct from one 
another. 
Although it could be said that the accused had control over the bag 
and its content, none of the other ingredients in the definition of 
'"possession'" in section 3(4) c.c. had been proved. This being the 
case left '"personal possession" the only aeans to ehow possession. 
Co1111on law states that for personal possession, one aust have 
knowledge (not only of the presence of the contraband but also in the 
case of prohibited items knowledge what it is) must unually handle 
it, and aust have a aeasure of control. 
The County Court concluded: 
'"Under the circumstance•, if I were directing a 
jury at this time, I would be forced to the 
conclusion that there i• no evidence upon which 
they could come to the conclusion beyond a 
rea1onable doubt that thil aan was guilty of 
the poaseasion of these drugs, or that 1uch 
.. idence waa •o deplorably weak it would not be 
worthy of the• to consider a further upect of 
the caee". 
* * * * * 
* a. v. Vautour 1 C.C.C. (1970) 324 
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CBara 01' UGllTS 
DUYUG VllILB UllDD SUSPDSIOR 
B. C. Court of Appeal February 1983 C.A. 1821013 
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights reads: 
'"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice." 
Recently {September 1982) section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 
became effective. This subsection, was no doubt, aimed at the defence 
of "no knowledge" in regards to a "driving while suspended" charge. 
The Courts have consistently held that a person cannot be convicted of 
this offence unless the Crown showed the accused had knowledge that 
his driver's licence was under suspension. Apparently, to circumvent 
this, subsection 94(2) stipulates that the offence is one of '"absolute 
liability'". 
A reference was made to the B. C. Court of Appeal {a rare procedure 
that can only be exercised by the cabinet) to of fer an opinion on the 
constitutional validity of the subsection. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal assumed more jurisdiction under section 7 of 
the Charter than what was anticipated. It was and is believed that 
section 7 only refers to procedural laws and issues only and not 
substantive law. Section 94(2) M.V.A. is substantive law and yet the 
B. c. Court of Appeal concluded that it had jurisdiction to strike it 
down. The reasons for judgment are confusing and leave numerous 
questions unanswered. However, subsection 94(2) M.V.A. is invalid 
legislation and everything, including knowledge of the suspension on 
the part of the accused mist be proved. 
* * * * * 
- 23 -
R. v. Sloney County Court of Yale kamloops Registry CCC 404 
The accused had a motor vehicle accident near •Joe'• Cabaret•. Before 
police arrived to investigate, the accused • ••• had one at Joe's·. 
At trial the Crown relied on section 237(1)(c) which provides that, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, a certificate shoving blood 
alcohol content at the time of analysis 18 proof of the alcohol in 
theaccused's blood at the time of driving. The trial judge found that 
the ·one at Joe's• was evidence to the contrary and there was, as a 
consequence, no proof what the accused'• blood alcohol content was at 
the time of driving. 
The Crown appealed the accused'• acquittal of a charge of ·over 80 
mg·. The prosecutor argued that the only B. C. case* similar in facts 
to this Sloney case, and decided by the B. C • . Court of Appeal in favor 
of the accused's position here, · had been superseded by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
The cases cited by the Crown all addressed the meaning of •evidence to 
the contrary• but none were similar in fact to this case or Kazan's. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had this to say in a case where the 
defence showed a possibility of m>re than one centigrade difference in 
temperature between the room air and that of the standard alcohol 
1olution: 
•Mere poBSibUity of eome inaccuracy will not 
assist the accused. What i• necessary to 
furnish evidence to the contrary is some 
evidence which would tend to show an inaccuracy 
in the breathalyzer or in the aanner of its 
operation on the occasion in question of such a 
degree and nature that it could affect the 
result of the analyah to the extent that it 
would leave a doubt a• to the blood alcohol 
content of the accused being over the allowable 
aaxi11Um·. 
It vae the underlined portion of the quote the Crown clai•d changed 
the law as established in ~zan. The accused'• breath analyses 
* l. v. ~zan SS CCC (2d) 444 
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resulted in readings of 180 and 170 mgs. Would the one drink •at 
Joe's• vi th these readings, leave doubt that the accused'• blood 
alcohol level was over 80 mgs. at the time of driving? 
The •practical question" was whether, because of the "presumption of 
equalization" (Section 237(l)(c) c.c.), the accused had to show that 
his blood alcohol level at the time of driving, because of •the one at 
Joe's" was below 80 mgs. , or does the burden of proving that it was 
over 80 mgs. remain with the Crown in these circuastances. 
The County Court answered that, by enlarge, the Courts have placed the 
burden of proof on the Crown and said that in these circumstances, the 
certificate is only evidence and not proof of the blood/alcohol level 
at the time of driving. 
In other words, the Crown should have called an expert to interpret 
the reading, taking the "one at Joe's" into consideration. 
Not having done that, the trial Judge had found as a fact that there 
was doubt what the level was at the time of driving. The appeal court 
could not disturb such a finding. 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Acquittal upheld 
* * * * * 
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nsTIJIOll1' r. M ACCOllPLICI 
COUOIORA1'101' 
Vetrovec v. The queen; Gaja v. The queen (1983) 1 w.w R. 193 
Supreme Court of Canada 
The accused and •everal others were convicted of conspiracy to traffic 
in heroin. At their trial a witness who had •muggled heroin from Hong 
Kong into Canada for them, had testified how these two accused had 
•trapped the heroin on him and had paid him for his efforts. 
The trial judge, in his six day address to the jury (after a one 
hundred day trial which resulted in a transcript of over nine thousand 
pages) had warned that it was dangerous to convict the accused unless 
the evidence of the accomplice was corroborated. Then the Judge had 
listed a number of items seized from the accused which were capable of 
corroborating the accomplice's evidence, euch as the passports of both 
accused ehowing that they were in Hong Kong when the accomplice said 
they were, paraphernalia related to the drug trade, large •ums of 
110ney, etc. 
The defence argued before the Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada 
that the evidence the trial judge considered to be capable of 
corroborating the accomplice's testimony was no auch evidence as it 
only related to the drug trade generally and not •pecifically to the 
transactions between the accused and the accomplice. Nothing 
corroborated the "'overt acts"' the acomplice claimed to have taken 
place, claimed the defence. The fact, for instance, that they were 
all in Hong Kong at the same time was too remote to corroborate all 
the things the accomplice aaid happened. 
The Supreme Court of Canada decided to reassess the general principles 
relating to the law of corroboration respecting the testimony of 
accomplice• and concluded that it was in need of reform. 
In 1820 the English courts .Sopted a real comaon 11en•e approach to the 
acceptance or rejection of the te•tiaony of an accomplice. One 
aentence in an .Sdre•• to the Jury in that year said it all: 
•tou are, each of you, to aak youreelf this 
queetion ••• 'Do I upon the whole, feel convinced 
ir;i my conscience, that this evidence 11 true, and 
auch as I .. , safely act up it?'"' 
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However, prior to and eince that tiae, there bas been a lot of •oul 
•earching about this iesue. It was perceived that there 18 eoaething 
•unsavory" about a person who participates in a crime and then, of ten 
for gain, accuses his partners in that crime. This resulted in the 
•accomplice warning" by Judgee to the juries as early as the 18th 
century which actually, like the one quoted above, 8ll0unted to: 
"Beware when you consider his testimony, he was an accomplice". 
In reasons for Judgements and books, a lot bas been •aid about this, 
euch as: 
". • • the main reason for the rule was that an 
accomplice may try to save hiuelf from punishment 
by procuring the conviction of others". 
"The danger is, that when a man is fixed and knows 
that his own guilt is detected, he purchases 
impunity by falsely accusing others". 
". • • an accomplice cannot be trusted because be 
will want to suggest his innocence or llinor 
participation in the crime and to transfer the 
blame to the shoulders of others". 
"It of ten happens that an accomplice is a friend of 
those who committed the crime with him, and he 
would 1111ch rather get them out of the scrape and 
fix an innocent man than his real associates". 
• • • an accomplice is not to be believed since he 
is a self confessed criminal and is morally 
guilty". etc. 
Some of these things were said before and after 1916 when a precedent 
eetting decision was made by means of which "corroboration" was 
defined and added to the •accomplice warning" and later by statute and 
co111on law to other evidentiary essentials. 
The British Lord eaid: 
"We bold that evidence in corroboration auat be 
independent teati110ny which affect the accused by 
connecting or tending to connect him with the 
crime. In other words it met be evidence which 
iaplicatea him, that ia, vhich conf ir• in •o• 
aaterial particular not only that the crime has 
been co-itted, but aleo that the prhoner 
co-1 t ted it". 
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We have •ince •trictly applied the definition to the extent of ignoring the 
real i••ue, whether or not the accoaplice 1• credible and can be believed. 
A ncent trend has nlaxed the application 80•what, and law nf ora recom-
mendatione are to liait ita use and in certain circwutance•, it has been 
legislated that it 1a DO longer nquired for the tutimny of rictims of 
certain criaes (Bill C-127). 
The Supreae Court of Canada reviewed that trend and the opinione of learned 
authors cd posed the question: '"Why have a epecial rule for .ccoaplices 
at all?. It reasoned that the Courta do not have to issue warnings when 
shady, untrustworthy, and disreputable witnesses testify. '"Why then should 
we autoaatically require a warning when an accoaplice takes the stand?" 
The Court concluded that the theory of corroboration is unsound and over 
cautious and has created an incredible body of coaplex law. •The result is 
that what was originally a siaple common sense proposition - an accom-
plice'• testillOny should be viewed with caution - becomes transforaed into 
a difficult and highly technical area of law·. The result is that what 
ought to be simple does now, because of its complexity, go right aver the 
heads of a jury and when they get to the jury room, they will, despite 
judicial instructions, approach the aatter with COlllllOn sense. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that accoaplices must be treated like any 
other witness. In some circumetances it .. y be appropriate for a Judge to 
iHue a clear and sharp warning of the risk of accepting the evidence of 
any witness, whether an accoaplice or not. 
The jury had, in this case, obviously believed the testiaony of the 
accomplice. 
Accused appeals dismissed. 
Comment: Perhaps to soften the blow for the defence bar who mist love the 
labyrinth of law surrounding corroboration (which aakes it difficult for a 
judge to instruct a jury without a flaw 80aewhere) the Supreme Court of 
Canada pointed out how haraful the practice was to the accused. While all 
of the comaon law around corroboration was there to protect the .ccused, he 
discovered to his horror that at the conclusion of his trial, when the 
judge is •opposed to warn the jury to be careful in .ccepting the .ccom-
plice 's testiaony, he was obligated to •ua up all of the evidence harmful 
to the accused, which aay Mrve to corroborate the .ccoaplice' s evidence. 
All of the damaging aspects that were •prinkled all through the evidence, 
are DOV all •ynoplised like a reainder to the jury of everything inculpa-
tory in tbe evidence. 
It must not be forgotten that this case only addresses tbe narrow que1tion 
if •corroboration• mist be included in the •accoaplice warning• to a jury. 
The ruling does not 1eea to strike down all the other co1me>n law and 
atatutory provisions dealing with corroboration. 
* * * * * 
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IBCOLLBCrlOB I:. IWBllTS - USE I:. IDl'BIOO~ 
C&U.IRG IIO'OllWft' AS VITDSS 'lO CJJBSTIOll Biii Cll BASOllABLB AllJ> 
Pm>BABU: GIOUllDS FOR SWIWlillG UPOlllATIOll 
The Queen v. Jolliffe County Court of Westminster April 1982 No. 
1816154 New Westminster Registry 
On the 20th of April 1 the accused was apprehended by police for 
impaired driving and refusing to give samples of his breath. The two 
count information was sworn on the 6th of September. The trial was 
held 23 months after the date of the alleged offence. The officers 
could not recall the details of the incidents and relied on their 
notebooks for their testimony. The officer who prepared the R.c.c. 
had a •specific independent recollection of preparing that report". 
This caused defence counsel to apply to have the informant called as a 
witness to assess the reasonable and probable grounds he swore be had 
to believe that the accused committed the alleged offences. The trial 
judge refused to grant the adjournment necessary to call the witness 
and the accused was convicted. Be appealed on the grounds that be 
should have been allowed to question the informant as the law* states 
that the onus is on the defence to show on the balance of probabili-
ties that the informant did not properly inform himself. He had been 
deprived of this opportunity. 
The County Court Judge agreed that the defence can call the informant 
for the purpose stated above. However, it applied to do so when the 
Crown closed its case. It is a judicial discretion whether to adjourn 
for the calling of additional witnesses. The defence had plenty of 
time to do so and the cases on this issue show that the appearance of 
informants are commonly applied for before or at the onset of trial, 
or with reasonable notice and not causing unnecessary delays. When 
informants are called by the defence, it is to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the Court as a fundamental isaue; after all, if the informa-
tion is a nullity, the Court has nothing to act on as this document is 
the foundation of the charge and justifies the proceedings. In this 
case there was no allegation that there was no proper basis for laying 
the charge. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
* a. v. Peavoy 15 C.C.C. (2d) 97 
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CUE OR COBTIOL OF .A IDIOR ftlllCLB 
Toevs v. The queen B. C. Court of Appeal CA 801099 February 1983 
The accused was found asleep in the cab of his pick-up truck on 
private property. His head vaa near the passenger door, his buttocks 
under the ateering wheel ad his legs reaching the floor. The lower 
part of his body was in a aleeping bag. The accused had attended a 
party in the house aituate on the property where he vaa found. As he 
had too auch to drink, he had arranged for a friend who also was at 
the party, to drive him home. At around 1 :00 a.a. be entered his 
truck, placed the key in the ignition ao his stereo would work and 
went to aleep. At 5:15 a.m., police &potted the accused and took him 
in for breath tests which resulted in readings of 160 and 170 mg. 
This resulted in a conviction for •care or control while over 80 
ag." which the accused appealed. 
A decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on the meaning of care or 
control* established that an intention to drive was not an essential 
element of the offence of "over 80 mg.". But the question raised in 
this case 1e: •can a person have care or control of a motor vehicle 
if his intention is to sleep in the vehicle rather than to drive it?" 
In regards to this, the Supreme Court of Canada said in the Ford case 
that intent to set the motor vehicle in aotion was not an essential 
ingredient to prove care or control. However, apparently, in view of 
Ford having started the car several times to stay warm, the Supreme 
Court had added : 
•care or control may be exercised without auch 
intent where an accused performs some acts or 
series of acts involving the use of the car, its 
fittings or equipment, auch as occurred in this 
case, whereby the vehicle uy unintentionally be 
aet in aotion creating the danger the aection is 
designed to prevent". 
The B. C. Court of Appeal concluded that the accused Toews did not 
have the care or control of hie truck. The Crown failed to establish 
* Ford v. The queen (1982) 65 c.c.c. (2d) 392. 
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the inference the accused intended to use the truck as a aotor vehicle 
- that is to have the care of control of it. As this •mtal element 
was not established, 
the appeal was allowed 
conviction was quashed. 
Comment: It is regrettable that the helpful Ford decision by the 
Supreme Court of Canada had to be tampered with and watered down. 
When reading the reasons for judgment it seems not unreasonable to 
assume that the B. C. Court of Appeal did all the maneuvering it could 
to avoid a conviction based on the application of a statutory 
presumption provision in circumstances for which it was apparently not 
intended. Well enough, should perhaps have been left alone. Nothing 
constructive seems to have resulted from this dispute of the 
application of the Ford decision; on the contrary, it has it less 
clear and, in B. C. at least, an unknown quantity. 
* * * * * 
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IYIDBllCI CODI 
Canada and aost of its provinces have legislated Evidence laVB which 
atipulate epecific rules of evidence. However, coneidering all the 
rules of evidence one will discover that what is contained in the 
Evidence Act is ainiscule as mat evidence rules exist at co1111on law 
cryatalized from judicial precedents or rules of the court. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada addressed iteelf to the aultitude 
of evidence ·rules and recommended an Evidence Code for Canada. This 
was nearly a decade ago and, although the idea of a Code was 
eupported, particularly by the Bar Association, the euggested content 
came under heavy criticism. 
The idea did not gather dust and the Conference of Uniformity 
Commissioners were given a mandate to come up with a new draft. The 
work is now finished and is a report on evidence and is available in 
most court house libraries. 
Some fear that an Evidence Code is another step towards codification 
of all law and leaving less and less to common law. Codified law is 
simply not flexible enough while common law can adapt itself to 
contemporary eociety through judicial precedents. With codified law, 
issues based on semantics often cloud erita and facts. The reports 
on the common law system really did not justify codification. It 
seems consistent with the bureaucratic philosophy that in the absence 
of a written rule or policy, the matter cannot be dealt with. 
Nevertheless, reports indicate some intereating changes in the 
proposed rules of evidence as they relate to criminal law, 
particularly in the areas of statements, corroboration, alibi, expert 
evidence, and competence and compellability. The following are 
predictions aade by knowledgeable people of the interpretation of the 
new rules, in respect to rules eurrounding the ad11i11ibHity of 
etatement. 
It ie proposed that a •peraon in authority• be defined. To determine 
if a peraon to whom a statement is aade was in fact a person in 
authority, the belief of the accuaed at that ti• is important. The 
couru apply a aubjective rather than an objective teat. As long as 
the accueed did not believe that the person to whom he epoke was a 
peraon who had authority with reapect to proaecution, then, regardless 
of his poaition, the recipient of the atateaent ie not a peraon in 
authority. 
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This eubjective test bas been criticized on many occasions, and it 
seems that the proposed definition is a compromise between the two 
tests and it •includes aomeone whom the accused could reasonably have 
believed had authority with respect to the prosecution·. 
In relation to voluntariness, the proposed rules seem to make the test 
leBB severe. Its definition seems to suggest that the •operating 
mind'" test established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Horvath v. 
The Queen (see page 22 of Volume 7 of this publication) will no longer 
apply. 
The proposed evidence rules also call for a lesser burden of proof to 
show that a statement was voluntarily given. It provides that it must 
be proved on the balance of probabilities rather than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
When an accused testifies during a voir dire or in his defence, it is 
permitted that he be asked in cross-examination if the statement he 
.made is true. The proposed Evidence Code prohibits this question. 
The argument has always been that when the Crown selects to adduce a 
state11ent in evidence, it does so to prove the truth of its content. 
If the statement is exculpatory and not believed, then it is possibly 
harmful to the accused's credibility. But it is the Crown's 
prerogative whether or not to adduce the statement. If the accused 
testified during the voir dire in the absence of the jury (the ones 
who mat determine if the content of the statement is to be believed) 
he does so in relation to the "voluntariness" only. The question at 
that stage is irrelevant. If he is asked the question when he 
testified in his defence, and the statement is inculpatory, then he is 
in a position of having to incriminate himself or collJDit purjury. In 
other words, the question deprives him from testifying on his own 
behalf. 
It is also suggested that Courts are allowed to consider the contents 
of statements to determine it they were made voluntarily. 
* * * * * 
More to follow in our next ~olumes. 
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POSSBSSIOll al ll>lJSIUUTIW: 1001.S 
UYDSK OllDS AID> 'llllt CllilTU OF UGBTS 
Regina v. Pugard County Court of Vancouver 
Regiatry December 1982 
No. OC820806 Vancouver 
The accused was found in poaseasion of a pair of aocks, a acrewdriver, 
and a flashlight, in circuastances that gave rise to believe that 
these things were to be used for bouae-breaking. 
At the onset of his trial the defence counsel asked the Court what its 
obligation was under aection 309(1) C.C. which atates that in circum-
stances like these the proof lies with the accused to ahow (on the 
balance of probabilities) that the tools were not intended for auch 
use. Counsel, of course, submitted that the reverse onus was contrary 
to the presumption of innocence (s. ll(d) Charter of Jlights). 
ln Ontario and Manitoba a County Court Judge and a Provincial Court 
Judge J;especti vely*, found that it is too aabiguous for a accused to 
detenaine what evidence gives reasonable rise to the presumption. In 
other words, when does a accused have to prove a contrary intention? 
The County Court Judge held that whether the presumption arises is a 
question of law. lf the accused is in doubt if there is sufficient 
evidence for him to have to rebut the presumption, he simply -kes a 
aotion of '"no evidence" at the conclusion of the Crown's case. lf 
there is enough evidence for the trier of facts to draw the inference 
that house-breaking was the intended use, the aotion will aiaply be 
denied. 
The Court held that section 309(1) c.c. does not abrogate the Charter 
of llights and Freedoms. 
* a. •· Bol•• and a. •· lovdezuk. - to the beat of my knowledge 
unreported. 
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POSSBSSIOB OF S'l'OLBll nonan 
Regina v. Horsfield and Muir Vancouver County Court, September 1982 
Vancouver Registry CC820642 
Three days after a break-in of a home, by a party unknown, the two 
accused at tended at the apartment of a friend. Horsfield brought a 
colour T.V. set that was taken during the break-in. The accused Muir 
and the friend stayed at the apartment while Horsfield went out to 
replenish the beer stock. His driving caused police to chase him. 
Horsfield went to the apartment block and used the intercom to alert 
his friends to get rid of the T.V. as the police were on his heels. 
Muir took the T.V. down some back steps and secreted it at the rear of 
the apartment building among the trash cans. 
When caught, Muir admitted to have hidden the T.V. in response to 
Horsfield's request. He admitted to knowledge that Horsfield had 
taken the set in a break-in and had hidden it in a park from where 
both accused retrieved it on their way to the apartment. 
The accused were charged jointly with Break and Entering and posses-
sion of stolen property with a value in excess of $200.00. 
Firstly the Crown did not prove the value of the T. V. set and as a 
consequence, the charge was reduced to "possession under $200." 
Then the evidence adduced by means of Muir's statement that Horsfield 
had told him that he had committed the break-in, had no evidentiary 
value against Horsfield to prove the truth of its content. It is a 
well established dictum that whether or not persons are charged 
jointly• the confession or admiSBions of the one is not evidence 
against the other. This meant that there was no evidence that either 
of the accused had committed the break-in. However, the statement had 
full value to show knowledge on the part of Muir that the T. V. was 
stolen. 
Muir's defence counsel raised an interesting argument. He questioned 
whether his client's physical possession of the T. V. set (when he 
carried it out of the apartment and hid it behind the building) was a 
form of posseasion prohibited by law. Basing his arguments on pre-
•ioua judicial decisions• counsel submitted that possession for the 
purpose of disassociating oneself from a possession iaposed upon him, 
is not an unlawful poHesaion. For example• if there was a smash and 
grab and the pursued culprit forces the proceeds of his crillinal act 
into the bands of a innocent bystander then if that bystander dis-
aaaociates hiuelf from the poHeHion by discarding theae proceeds• 
bis temporary possession is not an unlawful one. 
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The Court agreed with the viewa of defence counsel but held that where 
it 1a found as a fact that the purpose of the discarding vae to .asist 
the culprit, then the poaseaaion is culpable. 
Said the Court: 
"'I a11 satiefied from the circwutances that 
when Muir carried the televhion Ht froa the 
apartaent block and aecreted it behind the 
building he did · ao in order to aid and abet 
Horsfield, to evade detection by the authori-
ties and to mecrete the itea. This was not a 
circumstance where posseHion was iaposed upon 
him unwillingly". 
Both accused acquitted of B & E 
Convicted of possession of stolen property 
* * * * * 
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IS 'IBB '"VAlllUG• A COllDinOll PDCEl>Bft !O .&mlISSUILITrf 
legina v. McKenna County Court of Westminster November 1982 Hew 
Westminster Registry No. 81-7014 
During the trial for a drinking/driving offence, the Judge would not 
admit a statement made by the accused to the police officer because 
there was no evidence of a warning. Said the trial judge: '"But if 
the accused is not warned, 1the Court must have llOme doubt in its mind 
.. 
. . . . 
The accused was acquitted and the ruling on the admissibility was one 
of the grounds for appeal by the Crown. 
The County Court Judge said: 
"In my opinion that is incorrect. There is no 
basis for that conclusion. There is a bash 
for stating that it is desirable to give a 
warning, and the fact that a warning was not 
given is a factor to be considered in determin-
ing voluntariness" • 
AB there was no coersion, promise, or threats, the conversation was 
voluntary and the statement was admissible. 
* * * * * 
- 37 -
f AILillG Oil UPOSillG 
l.egina v. Bell County Court of Prince Rupert - Deceaber 1982 Prince Rupert 
legistry No. 79/82 
The accused vas tried for •refusing• to comply with a demand for aamples of 
bis breath. He had accompanied the officer and did put his mouth on the 
110uth-piece and apparently did blow. The aamples be gave were •imply 
inadequate to aalte an analyaes. The accuaed vu convicted and appealed 
claiming that perhaps he bad. •tailed· · to aupply an adequate aample of 
breath but ·he had not •refuaed• to coaply with the officer'• deaand. 
The semantics about the distinction between these two verbs is as old as 
the aection itself, and has been argued over and over again and reached 
several times the Courts of Appeal. Here are aome of the phrases used in 
response to defence submissions that there i• a distinction: 
•They create a single of fence l that is one 
offence of non-compliance ••• • 
•. • • it is difficult to aee any difference 
between auch 'refusal' and 'failure' ••• ·2 
•Section 235(2) in our opinion, creates an 
offence, that is the failure or refusal to 
comply with a demand ••• ·3 
•. • • only one single of fence was created by 
the aection and that the word 'refuses' is 
fully comprised within the word 'fails' ao that 
a refusal was a failure".4 
The County Court Judge held and agreed that 'refusal' includes 'failure' 
but not the other way around; and that the words are not aynoniaous in 
circwutances as they were here. Therefore the infonaation alleging that 
the accuaed ref used to comply, did not aeea to provide the particulars of 
the incident which vu the baais for the charge. The Court held not to be 
coapelled to follow the precedents quoted uove u the facts were distin-
auiahable f rOll thoae found in this caae. 
* * * * * 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction aet uide 
1 R. v. Kitcheaonia (1973) 12 c.c.c. (2d) 225 Saakatchewan Court of Appeal • 
2 a. v. llacLennan (1973) 13 C.C.C. (2d) 217 Nova Scotia Supre• Court, 
Appeal Diviaion. 
3 R. v. llacHeil (1978) 41 C.C.C. (2d) 46 Ontario Court of Appeal. 
4 a. v. llacLennan (1973) 13 C.C.C. (2d) 217. 8. C. Court of Appeal. 
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ASSAULT - TIBSPASSIBG lllVS UPOllTDS 
legina v. Silber and Silber 
Vancouver Begstry CC820556 
County Court of Vancouver September 1982 
Kr. Hicks (representing a T.V. station) phoned Silber Sr., (one of the 
accused) at his picketed furniture store. The labour problems were appar-
ently news worthy and Hicks suggested to televise the strike activities and 
interview customers. Silber Sr., aade it abundantly clear that he did not 
want Hicks on his property. Despite this, Hicks showed up three hours 
later with Kr. Chu, his camerman, and did as he had proposed over the 
phone. After alerting police, Silber went out and grabbed the 111.crophone 
out of Hicks' hands and said: •I told you to get off my property•. Hicks 
replied: "I told you I was not going to accept your deal•. A tussle 
ensued between the accused Silber Sr., and Hicks and the accused Silber 
Jr. and Chu. The object of the latter was to remove the film from the 
camera. As a result, father and son were charged with counts of assault 
and were acquitted. The Crown appealed. 
The trial judge had found that Hicks and Chu were trespassers; Hicks 
directly as he was told not to come onto the property and Chu impliedly. 
The Judge bad described the scene as a powder keg and said that the defi-
ance by Hicks and Chu of the owner's wishes could well have provided the 
proverbial spark. Be bad found the actions by the two accused not surpris-
ing as "the law cannot expect them to wait and judge with nicety whether or 
not they should wait for their lawyers·. 
The trial judge held that it was hard to imagine a mre flagrant and blame-
worthy trespaasing and that the actions by the Gilberts were understand-
able. When the Crown submitted that the accused never gave the trespassers 
a chance to comply with their instructions, the Court replied that they 
were given a three hour chance when Hicks was told not to coae onto the 
property. 
The County Court Judge defined trespaHing as unlawful entry or atay on 
another man's land. He noted that improper use of aomeone else's land is 
included in trespassing. Section 41(1) c.c. provides that a trespasser may 
be re110ved if no more force than necessary is used, and if the trespasser 
overtly resists he assaults the person who is authorized. to remove him. 
The Crown contended that the object of the struggle was not exclusively to 
re110ve the trespa88er& but predoainently to seize their equipment. In such 
circuaatancea said the prosecutor, section 41(1) c.c. is not available. In 
other word1, the Crown argued that the accused had ulterior motives and 
were after the equipment rather than the reaoval of the trespassers. 
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The County Court held that had the •ole objective been to interfere with 
the property of the tre•paeeers then the owners (accused) would find them-
aelvea not protected by the aectlone of the Criminal Code. Bovever, where 
•uch interference 18 justified ad •imply ancillary to the removal of tbe 
tre•paaeers, the protection of the law la available to thea. 
With a warning that landowners cannot rip film out of the cameras of tres-
passers and 8eize them, and will find themselves facing criainal charges if 
they do eo without just cause, the County Court Judge held that in the 
circumstances as they presented themselves in this case, the accused were 
entitled to the protection provided by •ection 41 c.c. 
* * * * * 
Appeal dismissed 
Acquittals upheld. 
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COB Oil COll'raOL 
Kcllwaine v. The Queen County Court of Vancouver Island, January 1983. 
Victoria Registry 22317 
The Supreme Court of Canada decided in February 1982* that it is !Wt neces-
sary to prove that a person had any intention of putting a motor vehicle in 
motion to be found having the care or control of that vehicle. Nor is s. 
237's definition of care or control exhastive and the only means to show 
care or control. 
The accused Mcllwaine parked in a park and drank beer with his brother. Be 
was found by police asleep and slumped over the wheel. He was taken to the 
police station and "blew 1.4". Be was convicted and appealed. 
The accused had testified at his trial that, realizing he had too much to 
drink to be driving, he decided to stay right - where be was and sleep it 
off. Therefore he had no intention to put his pick-up truck in motion. 
One Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada had in the Ford case elaborated 
a little more on the meaning of care and control. Be said that the person 
had to exercise the care or control in such a way "that the vehicle may 
unintentionally be set in motion creating the danger the section is 
designed to prevent". The County Court Judge concluded this to mean: 
"Put in another way negligence in the care or 
control leading to or likely to lead to motion 
is the basis of the offence but there is no 
need to prove the accused intends to put the 
vehicle in motion". 
The accused being asleep when found, could hardly have had any intentions 
to drive. Therefore he had successfully rebutted the presumption of care 
or control under s. 237 c.c. The question remaining then is if the accused 
had care or control in these circumstances. To answer that, the Court had 
to consider if unintentional setting in m>tion was applicable here, despite 
the fact that the accused claimed that the ignition key was in his back 
pocket. 
Regardless of the location of the keys, the circW1Stances were such that it 
was possible that the truck was unintentionally put in motion. 
* * * * * 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* Ford v. The queen (1982) 65 c.c.c. (2d) 392 
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legina v. Johnny, B. c. Court of Appeal - March 1983 - CA810711 
The accueed and one "'Billy"' were charged with eecond degree aurder of a 
woman but convicted of .. nalaughter. They mppealed. 
The Crown had adduced convenationa between the two euapects while they 
·were held in a cell block. The interception was authorized by a Judge 
under the Criainal Code provieions (s. 178 12 C.C.). 
The accused Johnny based his mppeal on the cell-block being a place where 
interceptions of private communications are prohibited and for which no 
authorization can be granted (1. 178.13 c.c.). Be claimed that the cell-
block was a "'place ordinarily used by a solicitor or by other solicitors 
for the purpose of consultation with clients"'. 
Two of the three Justices agreed with the trial judge and found his obser-
vations reasonable. lie had said that the days the two accueed were in the 
cell-block no solicitor used that part of the premises to interview the 
accused or anyone elae. Furthermore, be held that cells are normally 
utilized to detain persons and not for lawyers to interview clients. 
The third Justice said that the normal utilization of the cells to detain 
persons did not preclude them being used for lawyers to interview 
detainees. Be questioned the interpretation the trial Judge had given to 
the term "any other place ordinarily used by a solicitor'". lie felt that 
frequency of use was not neceHarily a 11eans to establish if the place was 
"'ordinarily used• for something. •ordinary use" is a fluid concept, he 
said. Although he felt that there was a wrong interpretation, he did not 
feel that his perceived error in law resulted in an error to admit the 
evidence obtained. He joined his brothers in 
disaissing the accused's mppeal. 
* * * * * 
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caoss DAllIJIA.TIOll ow CJ.AIMltD GOOD CllAliCDll 
The queen v. Wilson B. C. Court of Appeal - March 1983 CA 821147 
It is a basic rule that where an accused claims good character the Crown 
may lead evidence to show bad character. When an accused puts his charac-
ter in issue he is wide open to rebuttal evidence and/or cross exallination 
related to the subject of character. 
The accused was charged with rape and his aggressiveness became an issue. 
He called witnesses to say how free of violence he was, drunk or sober. 
When the accused took the stand he was questioned about him slapping around 
a woman who bad resisted his sexual advances. However, the Crown did not 
call this woman as it had concluded that she would be an untruthful and 
unreliable witness. 
In other words, the prosecutor did not have "reasonable grounds for think-
ing that the imputation conveyed by the question was well founded or true". 
The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that there is a rule that overrides 
the basic rule mentioned above. The cross examiner who makes a suggestion 
of prior wrong doing on the part of the accused must have a proper basis 
for doing so". If this was not so "there is a risk of unfair prejudice to 
the accused through a powerfully persuasive innuendo being wafted in to the 
jury box". 
In this case the prejudice was so grave that no direction of the trial 
judge could cure it. The Court suggested that in some cases a voire dire 
should be requested to avoid cases like this. 
Two of the three justices of the B. C. Court of Appeal directed a verdict 
of acquittal. 
• • • • • 
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ID'USIBC 'l'O nDDUCE Dl.IVBl.'S LIClllCI - OBSftlJCTIOB 
legina v. White and White County Court of Prince Rupert December 1982 
Ro. CC196/82 + CC173/82 
A police officer found a car parked on private property (a lot belonging to 
an auto body •hop) with •everal occupants. A dance was ongoing in a nearby 
comaunity ball and the officer'• eole reason for checking the car was his 
concerns about the poBSibility that there vas liquor being consumed in a 
public place and that the person behind the wheel (care or control) was 
impaired. (At trial, there vas no evidence adduced of either these 
offences). 
The officer asked the accused Mord,s White who was sitting behind the wheel 
to produce his driver's licence. While be was in the process of complying, 
the accused Henry White, told Morris not to do eo. Morris .ccepted Henry's 
advice and both were arrested for obstructing a peace officer in the lawful 
perfonaance of bis duty. They appealed their convictions by the Provincial 
Court. 
The trial judge had found that t~ car was a public place under the Liquor 
Control and Licensing Act mid that the lot was one the public resorted to. 
He had also said, that under the Motor Vehicle Act, be would have to strain 
the definitions to hold that the car was on a highway. However, in view of 
the grounds for believing an offence under the Liquor Act was committed, 
the officer was justified in what he did. 
The County Court Judge held that there was no evidence that either one of 
the accused had driven or operated the car on a highway. Therefore, 
considering the wording of section 30 of the Motor Vehicle Act, the officer 
had no lawful reason to ask for the driver's licence~ The trial judge had 
found as a fact that the lot was a public place in respect to the liquor 
laws, but not a highway so as to demand the inspection of a driver's 
licence. Therefore, there was no obligation on Norris White to produce his 
driver's licence and Henry White's advice was proper. Therefore neither 
accused obstructed the constable. 
Appeal allowed 
Convictions qua•hed 
Comlent: -It seems an exercise in seuntica to uke a distinction between 
the definition of •public place• and that of a •highway• under our liquor 
and traffic lava respectively, and circuutance1 a they are in this case. 
The vehicle wu clearly in a public place and on a highway. The only 
obstacle ia that the obstruction was not baaed on a refu•al to identify 
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oneself to an officer who has reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that an offence was co111Ditted, but whether or not in these circU11Stances a 
person in care and control of a aotor vehicle is obliged to produce his 
driver's licence. Assuming that the courts had found that the lot was a 
highway, would their views in regard to that obligation have been any 
different? It seems clear that the County Court Judge would have held that 
there was no such obligation in that section 30 K.V.R. only compels this 
for a person who is driving or operating the motor vehicle while it is on a 
highway. It see• that "care or control" should be added to the section, 
particularly in view of all the other documents that need only be produced 
when one drives or operates his car on the highway. 
A Billlilar problem aay be encountered with section 62 M. V .A. which also 
places all responsibility to remain at the scene of an accident on the 
driver of the cars involved. An example of that is seen in Regina v. Kirby 
County Court Vancouver Island February 1983 Victoria Reg. #60668. 
Returning from a picnic, Kr. Kirby and his wife stopped at a · friend's 
home. When they entered the friend's home the Kirby's saw that their car 
continued its journey without them. The car rolled across the street into 
a parked motor cycle. The accused (Kirby) had been drinking at the picnic 
and the owner of the mtorcycle was far from amused when he viewed the 
remains of bis motorized steed, as a lll&tter of fact he was •angry, dis-
traught and belligerent". At the advice of his wife, the accused went into 
the friend'• home and claimed to have . done this as he feared the cyclist 
would become violent. 
The trial court had convicted the accused as he had failed, as the driver 
of a motor vehicle to have complied with section 62(2)(b) K.V.A. (colliding 
with an unattended .:>tor vehicle and not locating and notifying in writing 
the owner of name, address, etc.). The Court had found that the accused's 
fear was restricted to the cyclist calling the police and the probable 
discovery that the running away of the car and the accused's drinking had 
causal connections. 
The accused appealed his convictions and argued: 
1. that he was not the driver when his car collided with the m>tor cycle; 
or if he was the driver; 
2. that he had complied with section 62 M.V.A. as far as the belligerence 
of the cyclist perlllitted; and 
3. that he had acted in due diligence. 
The trial judge found that the accused was the driver by any definition. 
Be had parked the car improperly and was responsible for it rolling away on 
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ite own. ... The County Court Judge found this finding erroneous 
Subaection (2) of Hction 62 refere to the driver apecifically. 
Crown had charged the accused under aubaection (1), it would have 
to argue about. It places the obligation not only on the driver 
the •operator or other per1on in charge of a vehicle·. 
in law. 
If the 
far aore 
but also 
Heedless to say, 10• aectious of the Act require a little aore attention 
from the drafters of legislation. Purtheraore the Court ought to .:>re 
often apply that aection of the Interpretation Act (Federal and Provincial) 
which atatea · that enactaent aist be given the broad and liberal interpreta-
tion it requires to aeet its object. 
It is difficult to judge, by reading the reasous for judgment, whether the 
charge was justified or not. However• these cases do Ht precedents that 
have devastating affects when the aections are used in circumstances for 
which they were designed. 
* * * * * 
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CAR UCBSSIVB USE OF FORCE Ill SELF DEFEllCB AJDJllT 'IO IWISLADGllTD? 
PaOVOC&TIOH 
R. v. Faid Supreme Court of Canada March 1983 
The accused and another known drug trafficker (W.) lived in a trailer 
together. W. was known to have '"a violent temper". During a party the 
accused was told that W. bad or was going to put a "contract" out on him. 
When the accused arrived home he asked W. if what he bad heard was true. A 
struggle resulted. The accused testified that w., after some blow being 
struck had attacked him with a long bladed boning knife. During the fight, 
to disarm W., the accused ended on top of W. on the chesterfield with the 
latter "growling like a wild animal". The accused hit w. on the back of 
the head to render him unconscious. This only increased W. 's rage. 
Finally the accused got the knife away from W. but lost control over him. 
On the side of the chesterfield was a spear gun and W. · was heading for it. 
To prevent this and its obvious consequences the accused stabbed W. twice 
that he could remember. The wounds caused W. 's death. The accused had 
removed all evidence of the homicide scene; he bad the rug cleaned , took 
the chesterfield to the dump and burned the body of W. at the ·side of an 
abandoned road. Two weeks later the accused was arrested for trafficking 
and when questioned about his partner's lot, he made a number of admissions 
in respect to facts surrounding the murder and said: 
"He ripped me off, he ripped everybody off, the 
fucker deserved it". 
The above related circumstances were the accused's version and testimony. 
The Crown implied that the 1111rder was the result of a dispute over money 
and to rebut the accused's claim of self defence they showed that W. was 
5'9" and 170 lbs., while the accused is 6 1 3" and 240 lbs. 
A jury convicted the accused of second degree murder. The Alberta Court of 
Appeal ordered a new trial and the Crown appealed that decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal had reasoned that there was a "half way house" 
on this issue; something of a compromise, somewhat of a legal shelter. 
Aasuaing that a person has justification to def end himself but uses exces-
sive force in doing so and does thereby unintentionally cause the death of 
the aggressor. The Alberta Court had said that in such circwutances the 
absolute defence of a elf defence is, of course, not available to the 
accused as he is not guiltless of any wrongdoing. However, be should not 
be guilty of murder, but ~have the '"halfway house shelter of manslaughter" 
available to hi11. 
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The theory by the Alberta Court found no favor in the Supreme Court of 
Canada. The highest Court in the land unaniaoualy decided that there vas 
llO justification in codified law for this propolition. rurtbet'llOre it 
•would require proof and co•plicated jury charges and would encourage 
juries to reach compromise verdicts to the prejudice of either the accused 
or the Crown·. 
The Court concluded that there aiaply was no partial justification for 
excessive force. For whatever is excessive, a person ia liable and the 
consequences (death in this case) causes the defender to lose the defence 
of justification under aectiQn 34 of the Criminal Code. In other words, 
the Supreme Court of Canada said that there is no partial justification, 
and the accused is wholely responsible for the killing. However, where it 
is shown that the excessive force was applied without the specific intent 
to cause death or bodily ham likely to cause death (lee aection 212(3)) 
then, of course, the act does not amount to aurder but manslaughter. 
This is also what the trial judge had explained to the jury. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the Jury was properly instructed and concluded 
that the members obviously had not believed the accused when he explained 
that he had stabbed the victim in the back but had not intended to kill or 
cause bodily harm likely to cause death. 
The Supreme Court of Canada said that the uncertainty of this law exists 
· only in the llinds of lawyers and not jurors. 
•This jury was told that intentional killing 
was murder and . unintentional killing was 
aanslaughter. They found Faid guilty of 
aurder. 1 aee no reason for suspecting that 
the jury could have convicted for airder while 
harbouring any reasonable doubt as to intent". 
The Court found that the instructions to the jury were accurate and that 
Alberta Court of Appeal was in error. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction of aecond degree 
aurder restored. 
Another utter capable of reducing mrder to unslaughter is provocation. 
Bovever, preaence of provocation by itself 1a 1 inadequate to do so. There 
llU8t be a wrongful act or insult that would cause any nonaal person, for 
tbe 110ment, not to be master of his own •ind. If in auch atate one acts on 
tbe audden, before there 1a time for bis pa88ion to cool, then, if his 
reaction to the insult or wrongful act causes the death of the one who 
provoked him, that aarder uy be reduced to unslaughter. Of course, Faid 
had to choose what defence to use. It is obvious that aixiag the defence 
of aelf defence with provocation is like attempting to llix oil with water. 
The control required for the foraer, to aeaaure the resiltance to the 
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aggression endured ao it is not excessive, is totally inconsistent with 
claiming not to have mastered yout own mind due to passion, rage and the 
like. Although the victim had delivered blowe to the accused, the accused 
had in his evidence claimed the contrary to all the emotions required to 
create provocation. To successfully raise provocation as a defence (which 
is only capable of reducing mirder to manslaughter) it has to be shown that 
the accused must have killed because he was provoked, ·not merely because 
provocation existed". 
Defence counsel raised the issue of provocation before the appeal courts 
and said that perhaps the jury should have also considered such possibil-
ity. Of course, whether there is evidence capable of concluding that the 
accused was provoked is a aatter of law and for the judge to decide; 
whether the accused was provoked is a matter of fact and for the jury to 
consider. In this case there was evidence of provocation, but none that 
the accused was provoked. 
* * * * * 
